ABSTRACT This paper delineates the specialty field of forensic industrial organization (IO) as the application of theoretical and empirical industrial organization economics in the legal process of competition law enforcement. Four stages of that process that can benefit from forensic IO techniques are distinguished: detection and investigation; case development; decision-making and litigation; and remedies, sanctions, and damages. We survey the use of economics in such aspects as identifying potential forms of anticompetitive behavior, screening markets for competition law violations, determining causality, advising on appropriate remedies, and assessing antitrust damages. The paper discusses the role of expert economic witnesses in competition cases. It calls for an organization of forensic IO within the context of existing forensic institutes.
INTRODUCTION
Forensic science is the application of scientific disciplines to the legal process.
1 Scientific methods and tools have found productive and popular application in criminal law enforcement. Techniques such as DNA-profiling, blood spatter projection, and handwriting analysis are used to establish suspects, methods, and motives in homicide cases. They feature in television and documentary series, such as Forensic Detectives, which graphically describe the pivotal role of forensic techniques in police investigations and criminal law proceedings. Forensic tools have become important in the discovery of crimes, their investigation and presentation in court, and in establishing causality and damages. The field has its own professional journals, university curricula, respected national forensic laboratories, and institutes.
There exists a wide variety of applied forensic methods. Saukko and Knupfer's (2000) 3 volume Encyclopaedia of Forensic Sciences contains more than 200 different alphabetically ordered entries, ranging from Airbag Related Injuries and Deaths to Wood Analysis. Most methods derive from the natural sciences. They include biomedics-to determine skeletal trauma, make time-since-death analysis, or conduct morphological age estimationchemistry and toxicology-including ink analysis in document forgery and counterfeits-as well as physics-informing enforcers with ballistics, bloodstain analysis, image processing, and forensic IT-and engineering-understanding fire-scene patterns in buildings and motor vehicle accidents. The three volumes of the encyclopedia also describe applications from psychology-such as criminal profiling, eyewitness reliability, and methods to detect lies and deception. In addition, it has some entries on white-collar crime and forensic computing.
Economics is a science that has methods and tools to offer for application in legal processes. Insights from the discipline of industrial organization (IO) in particular are extensively used in the interpretation and the enforcement of the competition laws. Expert IO economists have made contributions to both the challenge and defense of mergers that raised competition concerns and alleged antitrust violations. They have assisted in assessing antitrust effects and damages, as well as the identification of new types of behavior that could potentially be anticompetitive. Their economic justifications have been taken into consideration in the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as the European Court of Justice. 2 The aim of this special issue on Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement is to delineate the speciality area of industrial organization economics applied in various aspects of the legal process of antitrust cases. It is an exciting area of work, in which a great many industrial economists are active. It generates a considerable turnover as well as large likely deterrence benefits. 3 The area has an active international conference circuit and its own society journal, the Global Competition Law Review.
The area nevertheless lacks a systematic description as a discipline. Saukko and Knupfer's Encyclopaedia does not contain a single entry related to economics-not even on forensic accounting, which is the analysis of financial and economic transactions for the purpose of assessing their legality. Likewise, there is no mention of topics related to economics in the description of forensic science that the Forensic Science Society gave. 4 There does exist an American specialists society, the National Association of Forensic Economics (NAFE). The association and its journal, the Journal of Forensic Economics (JFE ), has had a strong business orientation since its creation in 1986. In their inaugurating contribution to the JFE, John Ward and Gerald Olson set the research agenda for the field:
The primary focus of the research of the forensic economists is the measurement of market loss (damages) arising from market failures, contract disputes or torts. (Ward and Olson, 1987, p.2) Antitrust is mentioned as a specialization of damage calculation in public interest disputes, but considered an area of minor importance compared to business valuation. 5 Indeed, the vast majority of the papers published in the volumes of the JFE are on the quantification of damages in individual tort cases. Topics include the appropriate discount rate, expected employment duration, and the effects of progressive taxes in present value calculations of lost earning as a result of personal injury and wrongful death. Typically, more standard methods establish causality in these accident cases and has nothing to do with economics. Only a handfull of papers discuss applications of economics to competition cases. 6 In a further methodological paper in the Journal of Legal Economics, Ireland (1997a) recognizes the application of "econometric tests of causality" in antitrust, but keeps it outside the scope of forensic economics as "this element involves only a minority of forensic economists" (ibid., p. 7). Emphasis remains on damages assessments. Finally, Kaufman et al. (2005) define forensic economics as "the application of economics to litigation" (ibid., p. xv). The volume of seminal contributions to the field claims to offer coverage of "all the major topics in this sub-field" (ibid.) but contains not a single paper on antitrust.
We define the specialty field of "forensic IO" as the application of theoretical and empirical industrial organization economics in one or more of the various stages of the legal process of competition law enforcement. 7 It is close to antitrust economics, which is concerned with the economics underlying the competition laws generally. Forensic IO focuses on the study of techniques and tools for the enforcement of the competition rules by institutions and courts. Apart from antitrust economics, the area overlaps with law and economics, and the economics of law enforcement. Note that forensic IO is much narrower than IO itself, which is only in part applied to antitrust.
In his introductory contribution to this special issue, John Connor traces the use of forensic economics back to the first written record of an antitrust proceeding in the Roman Forum, more than 300 years BC. Connor discusses its subsequent role in modern cartel law enforcement in both the United States and Europe. He establishes a considerably longer modern tradition of applied forensic IO in the U.S. courts, but also sees an emerging field in Europe resulting from the European appellate courts' increasingly requesting sound economic argumentation and emerging private antitrust suits before the national courts. The paper focuses on cartels and surveys a number of methods for the construction of "but for" worlds and the determination of cartel overcharges.
Forensic IO is not limited, however, to the assessment of damages in antitrust litigation. It makes some of its more fundamental contributions to competition cases by assisting to establish causality. Economic analysis can help to determine, for example, the relationship between a collusive agreement between incumbents to restrict entry and low product quality due to a resulting lack of effort. Economics can be applied to identify market power and how it was abused. Its tools can also be used to value claims of merger-specific efficiencies, as well as to determine the extent to which the anticompetitively raised prices of their suppliers damaged intermediaries and final consumers.
To determine likely causalities requires a complex process of building a relevant economic theory, deriving testable hypotheses, and corroborating them with the help of econometric tests. Precisely this is the scientific method for which academic experts are consulted to produce objective and reliable truths.
8 As a result, it is on issues of causality that many of the more interesting differences of opinion exist between experts applying industrial economics to antitrust. In fact, the Daubert qualification of admissible scientific expertisediscussed in Section V-is essentially concerned with the question whether causation has been shown satisfactorily and by means of accepted scientific methods.
The relevant elements of the legal processes that forensic IO can assist should also be interpreted broadly. To begin with, forensic IO is not restricted to (criminal) cartel litigation and per se monopolization or abuse cases, the 7 One of the first references to the term "forensic economics" may be Boudin's 1984 book review of Fisher et al. (1983) , based on the authors' experience as consultants to IBM in the American IBM case, on which more in Section IV. See also Fisher (2000) . 8 On methodology generally, see Chalmers (2004) . On economics as a science, see Hands (2001). latter of which are few. In fact, the application of IO economics is often most powerful in investigations that come under the rule of reason. The same is true for merger investigations, in which the legality of acts under the antitrust laws is assessed ex ante. It is in these cases that the causality of economic effects often is an important part of the analysis.
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Forensic IO is also not limited to litigation. Instead, its tools find application in investigation, litigation and adjudication, as well as the enforcement of remedies. In the United States, Federal and State courts decide on cases that the antitrust agencies prosecute. Appeals can reach the U.S. Supreme Court. In Europe, competition law enforcement is mostly an administrative process in which the agencies take formal decisions. These decisions can be appealed with the national tribunals and appellate courts, or, in cases affecting trade between Member States, with the Court of First Instance and European Court of Justice. Actual legal proceedings are a mixture of the elements of the court-based and administration-based models. 10 The U.S. antitrust authorities have considerable discretionary powers in deciding to sue or settle cases, for example. Also, several parts of the European decision-making processes involve litigation-style events, such as oral hearings. Furthermore, the emerging private antitrust damage actions in Europe are primarily before national courts. Forensic IO finds application in all of these aspects of competition law enforcement.
Forensic IO is an academic discipline that contributes to the advancement of economics as a science. The debate over important competition cases often spreads from competition agencies and the courts to academia. Frequently, the stakes of the parties in competition policy matters are high and they are willing to invest in a good representation of their case. Likewise, the forensic experts testifying to the case in court have valuable reputations to protect and know that the opposing side will publicly scrutinize their contributions. As a result, the debates are often of high quality. Economic reasoning between theory and empirical evidence helps to support and sharpen the legal analysis of the facts and circumstances in the case. In return, the involvement in actual cases provides access to internal corporate documents that normally would be confidential and unavailable to the academic economist. The economic principles of landmark cases can so be an inspiration for academic contributions in the abstract that can be developed beyond the litigation deadlines and budgets.
As a result of this, in a growing number of competition policy regimes around the world, IO economics and the interpretation of the competition 9 See Coate and Kleit (1996) for a discussion of the use of economics in U.S. merger enforcement, and Bergeijk and Kloosterhuis (2005) Neven (2006) , Section IV, and Borrell (2006) . laws work and develop in a productive symbiosis. Novel business strategies cast up anticompetitive concerns that subsequently inspire fundamental academic research. The recent software and credit card cases, for example, stimulated the research area of network economics and two-sided market theory.
11
At the same time, new economic insights and techniques are being translated into revisions of guidelines and priorities in enforcement. The adoption of the efficiency defense in the 2004 EU horizontal merger regulation was likely influenced by the seminal work of Oliver Williamson. 12 Similarly, leniency programs have been revised on the basis of a game-theoretical understanding of the problem of internal cartel stability. Finally, courts have become increasingly open to considering economic justifications in their rulings.
It is possible to distinguish four (related) stages of the process of competition law enforcement in which forensic IO has a role: first, detection and investigation; second, case development; third, decision-making and litigation; and fourth, remedies, sanctions, and damages. In the following four sections, each of these roles is discussed in some depth. Section VI offers some concluding remarks on forensic IO as a discipline.
II. DETECTION AND INVESTIGATION
Competition law violations are different from more traditional crimes, such as murder or burglary, in the sense that anticompetitive acts often leave no obvious traces. There is not necessarily a body, signs of a break-in, or a crime scene. The fact that a cartel has raised prices, for example, can be difficult to prove with only time-series on prices and no data on costs. Often cartel damages to society are more indirect; for example, when reduced competition leads to lower quality of goods and services, less innovation effort, or the suppression of new technologies. Even people who are close to the cartel conspirators, including in-house counsel and in some cases higher management, may not know about the illegal practices that are going on in their organizations. Forensic IO therefore has an important role to play in the discovery of the very fact that a violation of law was committed, essentially in two ways.
First, economics can uncover anticompetitive aspects of behavior previously not understood as restrictive of competition. In this sense, economics informs the interpretation-or even the choice-of competition law rules and standards of conduct. A business practice is only anticompetitive if it is shown to be restrictive of competition by some plausible economic argumentation. Sometimes, a new type of antitrust violation is discovered through independent theoretical and empirical academic research. An example of this may be the insight that Steve Salop pointed out that price-matching clauses, although they appear competitive, can in fact sustain collusion. 13 Another example is the more or less accidental discovery of a suspicious lack of odd-eight quotes for actively traded NASDAQ securities by William Christie and Paul Schulz. Their research uncovered the market-makers' conspiracy, which led to an antitrust class action that was eventually settled in the late 1990s.
14 Also, the understanding of possible anticompetitive strategies often grows over the course of an antitrust investigation, or a history of related cases. A prominent example is the U.S. Microsoft case, in which the insight was developed, in particular in the testimony of Franklin M. Fisher, that Microsoft had attempted to levy existing monopoly power from the market for operating systems to that of internet browsers by means of a predatory tie between the two products. 15 This type of forensic assistance in antitrust cases is highly innovative, drawing on theoretical and applied developments such as game theory, computer simulation techniques, and experimental economics, thus advancing both competition law enforcement and academic research.
Growing economic insight also leads to the necessary differentiations in the application of the law. A recent example is the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Leegin. 16 In this ruling, a long-standing ban on resale-price maintenance was overturned. In this case, a number of leading U.S. economists, including Paul Milgrom and Carl Shapiro, addressed the question of whether the courts should continue to deem it per se illegal for a manufacturer to enter into a vertical agreement with resellers of their products to set minimum resale prices. They pressed upon the Supreme Court that economic research has robustly established that resale-price maintenance can have procompetitive and welfare-enhancing effects, and that the complexity of these effects calls for a case-by-case analysis under the rule of reason.
Second, forensic IO can help find recognized types of antitrust violations by systematically screening industries and firms. Some kind of irregular market behavior will typically arouse suspicion of an anticompetitive act.
17 A purchaser, for example, may be alerted to the presence of a wholesale cartel by a sudden increase in prices, or, if the cartel has divided the market geographically, by a refusal to supply by all but its local dealer. More sophisticated "tell-tale signs" of complicated abuses of dominance or collusion may only be detectable by specialized detectives who monitor markets to find 13 See Salop (1986) . Corts (1997) challenges the view that price-matching clauses are anticompetitive. 14 See Christie and Schultz (1994) violations. 18 Examples may be sudden atypical changes in sales conditions or product quality captured by the data, a decrease in price volatility over time, odd bidding behavior in an auction, or correlated capacity investments. 19 Monitoring markets for behavioral patterns indicative of collusion can help target further inspections of companies that display suspicious behavior. An emerging literature develops such "live forensics" methods to systematically screen markets for antitrust violations, in particular, cartels. Practitioners as well as academic economists contribute to the development of sophisticated antitrust screens. 20 They typically apply a combination of two types of indicators of cartel likelihood: structural and behavioral indicators.
The first type of indicator is based on structural characteristics of industries and markets in which theories of collusion predict cartels to be particularly sustainable and in which cartels were found in the past. 21 These characteristics include relatively stable demand for a low-tech homogenous product sold in large volumes by a relatively small group of more or less identical suppliers that frequently interact in a transparent market. Likewise, the absence of buyer power, or common cross-ownership may be reason to zoom in on certain industries rather than others. The second type of indicator uses behavioral screens of the kind discussed above. 22 It is applied to preidentified high-risk industries to identify potential antitrust concerns systematically.
Forensic IO can assist the antitrust agencies to discover and assess the illegality of certain business strategies. The U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, for example, has developed "cartel profiling" techniques based on its experience that cartel activity may take place in markets adjacent to industries under investigation for collusion, or to merger inquiries. 23 The division preemptively monitors industries in which convicted price-fixers are active as "mentors" in "cartel trees," or that are vulnerable to cartelization because they have the kind of market structure characteristics discussed above.
Academic research can provide insights into uncovering such patterns. The paper by Vivek Ghosal, who worked for the Antitrust Division for several years, focuses on the genesis and taxonomy of cartel investigations. Ghosal examines the dynamic interrelationships between civil and criminal investigations. His empirical findings suggest that prior criminal prosecution of firms and individuals, as well as information gleaned from merger and monopolization investigations, provide useful leads for future cartel prosecutions. Ghosal also finds that cartel prosecutions rise following economic downturns, which he relates to the stability and breakdown of cartels.
Independent and active detection of antitrust violations is important for an effective enforcement regime. It allows for an efficient allocation of limited enforcement budgets over various antitrust priorities. This helps to create a sufficiently high probability of discovery by the authorities, which in turn is essential to destabilize active cartels through the leniency programs. 24 In their paper in the issue, Hans Friederiszick and Frank Maier-Rigaud argue that ex officio inspections remain crucial in an era where many cartels apply for leniency. Their contribution reflects a high-level strategy debate in the European Commission's Directory General Competition. Friederiszick and Maier-Rigaud make a strong case for a mixed instruments methodology in which complementarities in enforcement are exploited.
Peter van Bergeijk offered another perspective from inside the agencies. In his contribution, he revisits the Dutch construction cartel, which was a complex and wide ranging case of collusion that involved the majority, in terms of market share, of construction companies in the Netherlands and lasted for at least ten years. Van Bergeijk is one of the people responsible for the Dutch "Cartel Paradise" lost. He worked for the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) as an economic expert on the construction cartel case. His cartel post mortem offers intriguing insight into this Dutch case, as well as useful suggestions for tell-tale signs of collusion with wider application.
Companies take a keen interest in forensic IO methods to detect antitrust violations as well. To know what kind of collusive markers can trigger an investigation by the agencies is obviously useful for hard core repeat cartel offenders of the type that the U.S. DOJ profiles. In particular, it can help them to hinder, or even avoid, detection. It has been documented how specialized cartel consulting firms organize secretive meetings, making sure no physical evidence leaves the smoke-filled room. 25 Just like a sophisticated thief makes sure to wear gloves to avoid leaving fingerprints, so will white collar crime constantly professionalize. To make avoidance difficult, it is crucial that the antitrust agencies make sure that they continue to update their use of the latest detection methods in their struggle to stay ahead of this game of hide-and-seek.
Private-eye antitrust detection can also serve a legitimate demand. In larger companies, it may well be the case that the owners or senior management 24 See Rey (2007) . 25 Case COMP/E-2/37.857, PO/Organic peroxides. Commission decision of 10 December 2003. disapprove of anticompetitive practices, but have insufficient oversight over their complex organizations to know of the existence of violations of the competition laws. Lower managers in subdivisions or remote parts of the world may use collusive schemes to fix the division targets to which their personal bonuses are tied, thus leaving the firm with future liabilities. 26 Higher management that does not deal adequately with cartel problems may even risk criminal prosecution. Those benefitting from the conspiracy often manage to hide the cartel from in-house counsel, which has a duty to report irregular activity. 27 Alternatively, in planned acquisitions or mergers, forensic IO detection methods can support due diligence inspections by the prospective buyer. Internal audits for corporate-risk analyses can find potential antitrust problems before the authorities do and clean them up. 28 Leniency programs offer companies a way to resolve their unwanted antitrust problems, if they manage to discover a cartel in their organization before anybody else does. Compliance programs can subsequently be put in place to help prevent future violations. 29 As the market for these forensic services develops, so do the methods of detection available to public policy.
III. CASE DEVELOPMENT
A second role for forensic economics in competition law enforcement exists in providing assistance in the development of cases before litigation, either on the agency or prosecutor side, or on the defense side. Partially, this concerns forensics issues such as collecting physical evidence of monopolization strategies or cartel meetings, such as paper minutes, e-mail correspondence, or conference call records, which goes beyond initial detection. 30 This type of investigation aims to build a profile of individuals and their networks similar to the traditional white collar crime forensics methods that the introduction mentioned. It can benefit from the analysis of information that is readily available within the business environment through employment records, expense claims, and network data. Forensic accounting and IT techniques can be 26 On corporate governance issues and corporate crime generally, see Alexander and Cohen (1999) , Paul (2000) , and Green (2006) . Jamieson (1994) , Garoupa (2000) , Spagnolo (2005) , Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) offer applications to antitrust. 27 Sophisticated methods to hide cartels internally have been revealed in several of the cartel cases recently documented, including the auction houses cartel. See Mason (2004) . 28 See Anastasi (2003) for an account of the role of forensics in corporate fraud detection. Internal company data often allow for analysis of evidence of personal benefit, such as preferential treatment or bribes, and on-the-job surveillance. The industry has developed highly sophisticated tools, including packages such as ISYS, DTSearch, and Attenex that assist in extracting relevant intelligence from background noise. 29 See Beckenstein et al. (1983) 30 In U.S. vs. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232, for example, discovered internal emails on the "jihad to win the browser war" played an important role in establishing the intent to monopolize.
used to recover deleted files, for example. 31 It may further involve covert surveillance, handwriting analyses, and voice recognition to identify responsible individuals and their network. Forensic IO can advise here on targeting inspections in "dawn raids" on the premises of companies by identifying the type of suspected antitrust violation and the likely evidence that it leaves.
The main function of forensic IO, however, is in building the economic logic of a case. The economics applied in this is closest to the material that the IO textbooks cover, and so I confine myself here to only a brief discussion. 32 The extent to which industrial organization economics can be used in a competition case depends very much on the nature of the case. In merger investigations, structural models and econometric specification are important in determining postmerger effects and matching divestitures. IO theory and empirics also underlie monopolization cases in the United States and abuse of dominance cases in Europe. Here economics can point out the principles that may be at work to subvert competition, or the other way around, show how behavior that appears anticompetitive is genuine competition. In per se cartel proceedings, the finding of an infringement will be based on direct evidence. Nevertheless, economics can help determine whether the market structure is conducive to collusion, whether there is an incentive to collude, or if a cartel could be sustainable.
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In any case of substance, both sides are likely to benefit from employing economic advisors and both sides typically decide to do so. The standard of economic work in many antitrust investigations is high, often leading to additional insights and a deeper understanding of economics. An advanced form of economic consultancy has developed that applies cutting edge economic techniques, reasoning, and evidence. These competition practices employ PhDs in economics and industry experts. They maintain international and academic networks, which allows them to put together teams of experts with a division of labor that is tailored to the case at hand.
A number of routine economic analyses, such as application of the SSNIP test for the determination of the relevant market, HHI calculations for merger assessments, or the Pivotal-Supply-index (PSI) have become standard procedure. 34 Yet, diversity across industries ensures that many competition disputes have one or the other fundamental issue of general economic interest. In some of the landmark antitrust cases, such as Microsoft and Leegin, but also the VISA/ Mastercard private antitrust damages case, the contributions of economists involved have been crucially innovative. 35 They generated important positive 31 See Volonino (2003) on the admissibility of electronic evidence in computer forensics cases. 32 Tirole (1988) , Carlton and Perloff (2006), and Motta (2004) . 33 See Milne and Pace III (2003) , Werden (2004), and Johnson (2007) . An early contribution in the JFE is Einhorn (1989) . 34 Bishop and Walker (2002) externalities for our general understanding of the workings of these special markets and the potential monopolization, abuse, and cartel strategies to which they are exposed.
The same is true for some of the larger merger investigations. In GE/ Honeywell, which was cleared in the United States after thorough investigation, the European Commission blocked the merger on the basis of a rather adventurous conglomerate merger theory. 36 It feared that postmerger product bundles of GE and Honeywell would be so attractive to customers in comparison to the separate components that rivals offered that the competition would be forced out of business. The decision caused considerable debate.
37 It further highlighted the uneasy relationship between law and economics in European competition law enforcement when the Court of First Instance rejected most of the Commission's analysis while upholding its decision to block the merger. Other merger inquiries where forensic IO made competition law enforcement history are Staples/Office Depot in the United States and Volvo/ Scania in Europe. 38 In both cases, sophisticated econometric analyses were entered to predict post-merger market developments to support the challenge of the proposed merger.
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In each case, the choice of modeling has to go with the structure and type of competition in the industry and the particular competition concerns at hand. The more interesting landmark antitrust cases center on questions about the specification of the nature of competition. A theory of harm related to margin squeeze, for example, requires a dominant wholesaler who is vertically integrated in part of the retail market. An allegation of price predation would need to be sustained by showing pricing below long-run average costs, as well as the predator's likely ability to recoup initial losses. Crude observations on the industry should fit such model specifications. 40 There is a danger in applying off-the-shelf instruments rather than bespoke models. In particular, this is the case in the use of merger simulation models, some of which are readily available as a user-friendly software package with an appearance of generality, whereas outcomes are very much dependent on the details of structural and empirical specifications. When the models remain undisclosed to opposing sides, which often is the case when the algorithms are proprietary to the consultants, they can obscure rather than enlighten the understanding of merger effects. See Baker (1999) and Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) . 40 See Werden (2005) and Whish (2007) . 41 See Goppelsroeder and Schinkel (2005) and Walker (2005) .
At regular intervals, Jonathan Baker has reviewed the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases with various co-authors.
42 Baker and Bresnahan (2007) emphasize that difference among industries matters, although similarities with related industries are an important source of learning. The authors discuss a number of methods tested in past cases for the measurement of the magnitude of economic relationships and effects. These include various ways to identify buyer power substitution and market power, using different types of tests that are related to structure, conduct, and performance. An important concern in the use of econometric techniques is the quality of the data. The interpretation of empirical findings is further relative to a proper market specification. A high market concentration (few firms) in a bidding market, for example, may not be so much of a concern, whereas it can signal dominance in a regular production market.
In light of the many degrees of freedom with regards to model specification and data collection unfolds a discussion on "bright line tests." Easterbrook (1984) , amongst others, called for example tests to help reduce enforcement costs and create legal certainty. Baker and Bresnahan (2007) suggest that, where such tests currently do not exist, economics should further categorize generalizations and develop a standard toolkit that is sufficiently reliable for antitrust enforcers to use.
In his contribution to this issue, Fisher is not so optimistic. Based on his extensive experience in economic consulting and as an expert witness in some of the definitive antitrust cases of our time, Fisher warns against the dangers of giving in to the pressure from attorneys and judges to oversimplify economics. To do so is likely to lead to mistakes in antitrust decisions and generally harms the discipline. In his paper, Fisher gives several examples that are both entertaining and alarming.
One particular pitfall in measuring market power that Fisher addresses here, as well as in his earlier work, is to use evidence on accounting profits. Paul Grout and Anna Zalewska explore the boundaries for doing so in their paper. Grout and Zalewska carefully qualify excessive rates of return to confirm they have limited reliability, certainly for assessing standalone excessive pricing cases. The authors argue, however, that case-specific rate of return measurements, when handled with care, can help inform antitrust decisions.
IV. DECISION-MAKING AND LITIGATION
The process of discovery and case development is obviously geared towards final decision-making. Competition law is grounded in the economic insight that a workable competitive process is socially beneficial. As a result, 42 See Bresnahan (1992, 2007) and Baker and Rubinfeld (1999) . Bishop and Walker (2002) offers several chapters on the use of empirical methods in European competition cases.
competition law enforcement is fundamentally based on economic reasoning and evidence. The agencies apply economic analysis and interested parties will go to great lengths to present their case in the best possible light, using cutting-edge economic analyses, which reputable economic expert witnesses often present. Differences between the U.S. court-based system and the European administration-based approach, however, can have important implications for the type and quality of forensic IO analyses that are applied to a case. In the court-based model, parties present their case in a public arena before independent judges. Administrative law processes, on the other hand, can be less transparent. 43 On the other hand specialized administrations can build expertise over time in the cases that they deal with, which a general court may not. High-quality economic reasoning and quantitative analyses have historically played a more prominent role in U.S. antitrust than in European competition law enforcement. European practice is converging towards American practice, however, with the adoption and promotion of a "more economic approach" in recent years. 44 In addition, there is a call for establishing specialized national courts in the European Member States to deal with competition cases.
The quality of forensic economic analyses submitted is best safeguarded when the decision-making process is fully public. There appear to be at least three reasons for this. First, an open process reduces the scope for factors other than substantive arguments to influence decision-making. That is, favoritism, lobbying, political pressuring, and corruption are exposed more easily and thereby partly deterred. Second, an open process allows for all parties involved to learn as case law develops. Enforcers, firm management, attorneys, judges, and commentators can improve their understanding of economics and its application in antitrust. Third, the economists involved in competition cases can build-and destroy-their reputations. When economic analyses are available for critical examination by peers, sloppy or fabricated arguments are exposed. Unscientific analyses are weeded out, and thorough economics is supported by the possibility to establish a reputation for objective and highquality work.
The U.S. system of expert economic witnesses in court proceedings is one of the most open forums of antitrust debate. Expert witnesses submit their testimony, give it in court, and are subsequently cross-examined. In high-profile cases, this creates a competitive arena for discussion, in which industrial 43 The process of decision-making in competition cases by the European Commission and many of the Member States does involve elements of an open court system, such as oral hearings and disclosure of submitted reports. The European appellate courts, in turn, are often restricted in their freedom to consider economic arguments. See Neven (2006) . 44 See Vesterdorf (2005) , Roeller and Stehmann (2006) , and Vickers (2007) . DG Competition, and in its wake many national competition authorities in Europe, have created chief economist positions, which teams of PhD economists support. The goal is to raise the quality of standard of in-house economic analyses, as well as the ability to appraise outside experts' reports.
organization economics is truly put to the test. This is to the benefit of both the specific case at hand, and the field of industrial organization in general. Posner (1999) summarizes the U.S. law governing the use of expert witnesses. According to the original Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), anyone who has relevant expertise "by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education" is permitted to be classified as an expert witness. The expert witness should not in the first place be a consultant to the parties, but an independent professional who testifies on the evidence to the courts. 45 The expert has a moral and professional obligation to testify honestly to his or her professional opinion. 46 Posner does note that testifying experts tend to polarize over time, representing plaintiffs or defendants, but rarely both. This may reflect personal dispositions, but to the extent that it is a separating equilibrium, it may compromise objectivity and make it difficult for courts to choose between duelling experts.
A number of mechanisms, including professional rules of conduct, safeguarded the reliability and integrity of the expert's testimony. 47 Members of the NAFE, for example, are held to work by The Statement of Ethical Principles and Principles of Professional Practice. It specifies in its first article that:
Engagement
Practitioners of forensic economics should decline involvement in any litigation when they are asked to assume invalid representations of facts or alter their methodologies without foundation or compelling analytical reasons.
On diligence, it further requires in the third article that:
Practitioners of forensic economics should employ generally accepted and/or theoretically sound economic methodologies based on reliable data. Practitioners of forensic economics should attempt to provide accurate, fair and reasonable expert opinions.
In addition, the code contains several paragraphs that exist to ensure transparency of information, methods, and academic debate. The latter is also a legal requirement, as the expert must make the facts or data that he or she relied upon in forming opinions available for opposing counsel to cross-examine.
In case law, a higher standard for expert testimony to be admissible and sufficient to show causation has developed seminally since the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 1993. 48 In Daubert, the Supreme Court considered the question what are "reliable" scientific principles and methods and who qualifies as a scientific expert. Criteria to answer these fundamental questions on "the scientific method" were sought in evidence based on falsifiability, replication, limitations, and potential rate of error, peer review, publication, and general acceptance by consensus in the 45 See also MacKie- Mason and Pfau (1999) . 46 Posner (1999) academic community. The case was much debated at the time-involving several Nobel Prize laureates who in Amicus Briefs pointed out, amongst other things, the limitations of the peer review system as an indicator of scientific truth. The implications of the Daubert decision are still discussed today.
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This methodological debate led to a revision of rule 702 of the FRE in 2000, which now specifies on expert witnesses qualifications:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
A literature developed on expert economic testimony in antitrust cases. Beyond the fundamental question whether there is sufficient consensus in the economics profession for it to satisfy the Daubert test, Slottje (1999) collects expert witness accounts to provide insight into the "nuts and bolts of what forensic economists actually do" (ibid., p. ix). In the same year, the Spring issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives appeared, including Posner (1999) . Gavil (2000) is an early detailed legal study. The Spring 2003 issue of Antitrust on "Working with Economic Experts" contains various relevant contributions as well, including Milne and Pace III (2003) on successful and unsuccessful expert witness testimony in alleged cartel conspiracies.
50 Werden et al. (2004) discusses the use of economic models in assessing the competitive effects of mergers in the context of the Daubert criteria. Werden (2007) surveys the admissibility of expert economic testimony in antitrust cases.
In his critique to "bright-line tests" in this issue of the Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Franklin M. Fisher draws on his extensive experience as an expert witness in antitrust cases. In the process, Fisher gives various insights into how to be an effective expert economic witness. Several other leading economists had done so before in Slottje (1999) , making for entertaining reading. The first contribution to the volume is by Hendrik Houthakker and largely about his involvement for the DOJ in the landmark United States v. IBM, which was filed in 1969. 51 In this case, Fisher was the opposing principal economic witness to IBM. It ran for more than 10 years before the DoJ withdrew it as "without merit."
Houthakker describes how he was instrumental in advising the DOJ to "go after" IBM, "with its 70% market share in computers," as a top priority in 1967. In his later role as expert witness, IBM's counsel failed to intimidate 49 See Solomon and Hackett (1996) for an insightful review of Daubert from the point of view of philosophy of science. See Bernstein (1996) for a general critique. Ireland (1997b) introduces a special issue of the JFE on the Daubert decision. Krimsky (2005) him, Houthakker writes, because the lawyer who cross-examined him paled in comparison to the Gestapo tactics that he had faced in his youth as a prisoner of war. Houthakker resigned as a witness when the DOJ scheduled him for testimony during his fall classes in 1977. A few years later, the DOJ "threw in the towel." According to Houthakker, the government's decision to stop pursuing the case was political, and he criticizes the account of Fisher et al. (1983) that the allegations against IBM had been a mistake from the start. Houthakker experienced the adversarial element that litigation introduces into otherwise "generally peaceful" academia as not necessarily productive, which was a reason for him to select only a few cases to get involved in from that time.
William Baumol's (1999) account is brief but no less insightful, with several examples of how consulting experience contributed to his academic output, including contestable market theory. Top-level consulting allowed him to meet key players, Baumol says, and see things that he otherwise never would have.
Frederic Scherer's expert witness account is the most instructive and amusing. He too acknowledged a cross-fertilization between research and litigation consulting. To that end, he accepted cases with substantial "precedential interest" and avoided cases in which he would be "reluctant to submit my testimony to critical judgement by my economist peers" (Scherer, 1999, p.132 ). Scherer would further not testify on behalf of firms that were likely to have committed per se law violations and only in cases that concerned a limited number of industries that he knew well.
Scherer distills some valuable lessons from "surviving" roughly 40 years in "a blood sport" (Scherer, 1999, p. 129 ). The first is: "Know thy subject matter thoroughly." This lesson, Scherer explains, he learned the hard way: being cross-examined in the IBM case. Good preparations include reading everything, but also visiting production facilities, talking to product users, and preparing a chronology of key events. The second rule is: "Admit your mistakes and get on with the show." Third is not to try to deny the significant weaknesses in your client's case, as it may discredit the entire testimony. Fourth, "search one's prior writings for statements that might be construed as conflicting with impeding testimony." Such potential contradictions should be explainable and: "Altering views for specific testimony is not recommended." Finally, Scherer advises to: "always tell the truth, as best you know it" (ibid.).
A key concern with all of the contributing experts is to guarantee independence and objectivity-or to avoid the "whose bread I eat, his song I sing" attack, as Scher er calls it (Scherer, 1999, p. 130) . 52 The NAFE-code does not allow forensic economists to accept contingency fees, or fees that relate to the size of the court award or settlement. The large amounts of work that competition cases often are, are normally compensated on the basis of hourly fees, which may in part be paid into faculty funds. MacKie- Mason and Pfau (1999) offers an extensive discussion on advocacy issues, motives, and pitfalls of the expert witness. The authors point out that, because expert witnesses are repeat players, there is a market mechanism that induces professionals to guard their reputation for professional honesty and integrity, as these credentials-more so possibly than winning the case-generate future work. Although professional interests and collegial reputation may further help to encourage objectivity, experts should watch out for ego, obligation to the client, a deceptive team spirit, and the risk of getting locked into position.
In MacKie- Mason and Pfau (1999) , various pieces of advice to steer clear of these problems are given, including tips on how to choose a case and research it wisely. The authors recommend providing lots of quantitative evidence, tying testimony to a publication commitment, and being conservative in drawing conclusions-in the sense of trying to "err on the low side" (ibid., p.218). In all of this, an open relationship with the attorneys is important to be able to discuss reservations and doubts.
First and foremost, however, MacKie-Mason and Pfau advise due diligence in deciding whether or not to accept a case. The authors developed a two-stage approach to case selection for this, based on the difference between testifying and nontestifying experts. 53 In the first stage, it is agreed that initial research is done as a consulting expert, and not yet as a testifying expert, at a separate fee. Only on the outcome of that research does the expert decide to testify in the case or not. This approach leaves an exit option and no up-front commitment. The client benefits as well, in that the initial report and the materials shown to the nontestifying expert are not discoverable by the other parties and can be suppressed if they do not support the case.
For practicing lawyers, working with expert witnesses has become a speciality area in itself. Handbooks and consultants advise on trial techniques for how to select and present expert witnesses and prepare them to explain economics to jurors and judges. The expert can expect close scrutiny of his or her testimony and needs special skills and training to prepare for intense cross-examination. For that purpose, court sessions are sometimes extensively rehearsed. The detailed accounts in Slottje (1999) by Dennis Carlton and Hal Sider on Toys R Us, and by Lawrence White on the FTC's challenge of the 1986 merger between Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper contain various details on their 53 See Posner (1999) , p. 92. The requirements on discoverability of information shown to nontestifying experts are lower than to testifying experts. As a result, a division of labor has developed between testifying expert witnesses and their associates who help prepare the testimony. The latter are sometimes given a great deal of independence to avoid irrelevant information or intermediate draft reports being discoverable by the other party. This, in turn, has led to case law in extreme cases on the question of who effectively is giving testimony. See also Keyte (2003) .
preparation for trial and deposition. The aspiring expert witness can furthermore consult Bergman (1999) This extensive industry of specialized and high-paid employment raises questions on the economic efficiency of the system. Apart from the public good of just law enforcement and fair compensation, a cost -benefit analysis of the competition law enforcement process is essentially a comparison between legal transaction costs and deterrence benefits. A key factor in this is the quality of decision-making. In antitrust regimes that are open to erroneous judgements in the form of either false positives or false negatives, the incidence of competition law violations may be higher in anticipation, as Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) shows. An improved quality of competition law decision-making therefore has an efficiency effect as well.
Competition and reputation help to sustain neutrality and a high quality of work. 55 To stimulate both, several reviewers of the expert economic witness system have proposed further disclosure of expert witness assignments. Posner (1999) suggested that the American Economic Association could maintain a public file of the involvements of its members in antitrust cases, including electronic links to the testimony. Such improved transparency would help to maintain high professional standards and thereby guard the reputation of the profession as a whole. In addition, Posner and others have urged the courts to make greater use of their ability to appoint their own independent experts. They could help decide in cases in which reasonable economic expert witnesses disagree in their findings.
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Most of the above accounts and best practice rules relate to the U.S. antitrust practice. As remarked already, the European process of competition law enforcement can be less transparent than the U.S. court-based model. In his contribution to the issue, Andrew Gavil relates the American experiences with the use of economic expert witnesses and the Daubert rule to lessons for European enforcement. Gavil practices U.S. antitrust law and 54 See also Lopatka and Page (2005) . 55 Interestingly enough, in the more traditional forensic disciplines, models of competition are studied as a means to improve quality. Koppl (2005) discusses such competitive self-regulation for police forensics and forensic laboratories. 56 Scherer (1999) and Baker and Bresnahan (2007) . In Australian courts, it is possible to have all experts on the stand at once and questioning each other in the presence of the judge. A version of this "hot-tub" model is a meeting of the expert witnesses of opposing sides before the trial, in which they are to agree on their disagreements before giving testimony before the court. This latter version was used, allegedly quite effectively, in court proceedings following claims by Seven Network, an Australian television network, of anticompetitive conduct against a number of competing networks. The Federal Court in Sydney dismissed these claims at the end of July 2007.
teaches at Howard University School of Law. In his paper, he examines the preference expressed in the European Commission's Green Paper on Damages Actions for court-appointed experts over party-retained testifying experts. 57 Gavil questions some of the assumptions that underlie that preference and posits that reliance solely on court-appointed experts may be insufficient to realize the Green Paper's principal objective of promoting private enforcement of competition laws. He concludes that additional procedural tools to facilitate the development and presentation of economic evidence, including party-retained experts, may be necessary.
Currently, there does not seem to be an association or a common code of ethics for expert economic witnesses to the European courts or agencies. Nevertheless, the role of academic economists in the EU competition law is growing, as the revolving-door position of Chief Competition Economist at the European Commission exemplifies. Other functions, such as those of the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy, also seem to have similarities to nontestifying experts' work. The members of this group are all leading academics, who publish reports on competition issues in subgroups that importantly influence European competition policy. 58 The national competition authorities in Europe increasingly add (part-time and/or temporary) academic economists to their advisory boards and staff. In addition, there is a large pool of competition consultants available to assist the parties. Furthermore, various policy makers have argued for court-appointed experts in recent contributions and an increasing number of judges specialize in competition matters and receive economic training and advise. 59 The role and quality of forensic IO in Europe is therefore likely to increase in the decades to come.
V. REMEDIES, SANCTIONS, AND DAMAGES
The fourth aspect of the process of competition law enforcement in which forensic IO can assist is in determining appropriate remedies in cases in which an antitrust concern or an infringement has been established. Parties found to have breached the competition laws face a number of possible consequences, including interventions in the structure of the firm, disciplinary actions against management, and obligations to pay corporate fines and private damages. In merger control, competition concerns with the agencies can be overcome when the merging parties divest sufficiently large parts of their business to competitors or new entrants in the market.
The principles that underlie punishment relate primarily to concepts such as fairness, vindication, and compensation, which are in the domain of law, more 57 Commission of the European Communities (2005) . 58 See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/eagcp.htm. 59 Fingleton (2005) and Neven (2006) . so than of economics. Yet in antitrust, the law and economics approach of sanctioning to deter parties from stepping out of the boundaries of the law has had a strong influence on the way in which competition authorities have designed their merger control processes, sentencing guidelines, and other remedies. In addition, economics can inform how to remediate harm and repair competition. Therefore, industrial organization economics plays an important role in advising on effective remedies. The same kind of analyses that helped to identify competition problems can assist in stopping and further avoiding them. Forensic IO therefore has an important preventative role.
Economists play an essential role in devising strategies for restoring competition, especially in cases of exclusionary conduct. In some cases, the obstacle to workable competition is structural and can be removed. An early case in which this was believed to be possible is U.S. v. AT&T, which led to the ordained break-up of the company in the early 1980s. 60 The structural intervention aimed at reducing the company's ability to monopolize the telephone industry by erecting artificial barriers to entry and fighting entrants out of the market through predatory pricing.
61 Many smaller and independent telephone companies would compete more forcefully, reducing prices and stimulating innovation.
Similarly and more recently, the power of Microsoft Corporation to monopolize the platform market has been argued to relate to the company's exclusive intellectual property right on its popular operating system and network software, refusing to disclose essential elements of its application programming interfaces (APIs) to competitors. This makes it difficult for rivals to produce a viable alternative to Microsoft's products, in particular, applications software, which is compatible with Microsoft's installed base and that can induce its clients to switch. As a result, competition would be stifled and innovation with it. 62 The original proposals to split up Microsoft into a systems and an application software company were in part inspired by the idea that this would force the systems company to reveal more information on its APIs. On the same logic, the European Commission has ordained Microsoft in its official decision to untie some of its software bundles and make essential parts of its API information available to other software writers.
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Structural remedy negotiations are more common in merger control. As Section III noted, Phase II merger inquiries involve extensive economic analyses. They are often cleared only with considerable structural remedies. Large merger investigations include advanced simulation models that combine oligopoly theory and econometric estimations. The models help ex ante assessments of the likely effects of the proposed mergers. As a 60 United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F.Supp. 131 [1982] . 61 See Evans (1983) . 62 See Fisher (2000) . 63 See Evans et al. (2000) .
result-and with all of the caveats pointed out earlier-they can also advise on structural remedies on which the merger can conditionally be cleared, in particular, the divestment of parts of the merging firms' capacity. The detailed numerical scenarios that these merger models allow for can support divestiture negotiations between the agencies and the merging parties. The result is essentially a design of a post-merger market structure in which the competition concerns that the merger raises are reduced to a sufficient extent.
In the case of hard-core cartel violations or flagrant abuses of dominance, the law specifies what should be the appropriate sanction. For corporate fines, however, both U.S. and European agencies have in recent years committed themselves in guidelines to punishing antitrust fines. 64 The calculation methods that these guidelines imply relate the effective fine to the volume of sales that was affected by the antitrust violation, which is further fine-tuned on the basis of several multiplicative factors that relate to the gravity of the infringement and mitigating circumstances. Although crude and imperfect, this is a reasonable approach to setting fines with a bite-although more so for cartels than for abuses of dominance. 65 Forensic IO techniques can be used to estimate the appropriate base amount of the fine, which is not obvious in complex organizations.
In addition, enforcement regimes have increasing possibilities for criminal sanctions against individuals responsible for anticompetitive acts. 66 These sanctions can be more effective than punishing the company when they are targeted at the right decision-makers within the organizations. Organizational economics in combination with more traditional forensic techniques discussed above in the context of cartel audits can have a role in this, laying out the de facto corporate governance structures. Similarly, economics can advise on the design of incentive-compatible corporate compliance programs that can help prevent antitrust violations. Such programs can only be credible if combined with a managerial incentive scheme, such as bonuses and stock option plans, that have safeguards against individuals seeking illegal profits. These are largely unexplored areas of corporate governance theory, which are only recently attracting attention as a result of several corporate fraud scandals. 67 These issues have direct application in antitrust and, for example, in combination with private antitrust detection, hold a promise for increased deterrence.
Finally, forensic IO techniques are often used in the context of antitrust damages actions. This is the area in which members of the NAFE are most active, as discussed above. Part of the debate is on methods for quantifying damages and the design of an effective private enforcement practice. The latter includes questions such as whether or not class actions are possible and in what form, whether the pass-on defense should be available, or whether punitive damages are an appropriate mechanism.
68 For the most part, however, the quantification of antitrust damages is involved in practical work in preparing calculations for court proceedings or to support settlement negotiations. To reconstruct a but-for world with a sufficient degree of reliability requires an economic model of the market, in combination with a thorough econometric analysis of the relevant data to fit the model and determine the but-for price question with a reasonable degree of certainty, usually on the basis of time-series of prices. With the qualification and quantification of the but-for world based on economic reasoning, the subsequent determination of the antitrust damage total is essentially an accounting exercise, albeit one that can turn on complex issues of discounting and probability calculus.
In their contributions to this issue, Connor, Fisher, and Gavil cover several aspects of private antitrust damages actions. Connor surveys various methods to assess damages, including the before-and-after-method, the yardstickmethod, and cost-based approaches. He draws amongst other cases on the Vitamins litigation. Fisher explains the case development and litigation aspects of the Visa Check/MasterMoney class action, a private damage case in which he also was responsible for assessing the damage total that led to a landmark out-of-court settlement award.
70 Andrew Gavil discusses elements for the design of an effective private enforcement regime in Europe, where the practice is in its infancy and in need of further development.
VI. FORENSIC IO AS A DISCIPLINE: CONCLUDING REMARKS
The application of industrial organization economics to competition law enforcement is sufficiently multifaceted to be a speciality discipline of its own. The market for expert economic advice on competition issues and 68 See Rü ggeberg and . 69 See Hall and Lazear (1994) . 70 See http://www.inrevisacheckmastermoneyantitrustlitigation.com.
complementary forensic IO skills is highly specialized. Often the skills and knowledge necessary to address all issues in even a single antitrust case require the assistance of multiple experts. This necessitates considerable coordination and specialized project management work.
The market for competition advice is large. The need to be able to assemble tailor-made teams of specialists and analysts for projects that can go on for years creates economies of scale and scope. On the other hand, do all interested parties in a case require independent support, and can diverse client portfolios create conflicts of interest. The market therefore sustains an oligopoly of just a few advanced consulting firms. They employ economists trained in IO theory and econometrics at the best schools, highly specialized industry expertise, and a broad experience.
The various sides in competition law disputes, interested parties as well as the antitrust agencies, rely on economic consulting firms for assistance. These firms produce institutional reports, but importantly they also form a platform for independent academic economists, who work with them on selected cases and on a freelance basis. 71 For reasons of identifiable reputation, the testifying individual expert witness remains central-although still much more so in the United States than in Europe-and the consulting firms often act as nontestifying experts or support teams in the preparation of the experts' eventual testimony.
Universities can supply the discipline with graduates trained in the relevant economic disciplines. Most universities offer theory and econometrics courses. In addition, a few have specialized courses in forensic economics. Slesnick and Tinari (2001) , in the Journal of Forensic Economics, survey forensic economics taught in university curricula. They report very few organized programs on the topic-mainly their own-and just a few isolated individual courses, or elements of forensic economics introduced in traditional economics classes. The emphasis in the curriculum elements that the authors found in their survey is firmly on damages assessment in tort litigation. An exception, which their study did not include, is a semester course, "Forensic Economics," which John Connor teaches at Purdue University, which focuses entirely on antitrust.
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Antitrust agencies have forensic IO skills available at various levels within their organizations. Cartel and merger units each have their own specialists. As said, competition authorities in Europe increasingly follow the U.S. example of having a chief economist office and revolving-door positions for distinguished economists, like the position of Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis with the U.S. DOJ is. However, there presently does not seem to be a public institution or other form of centralized organization of forensic IO. At best, agencies have a forensic IT unit. 71 See Short and Sattler (1996) . 72 See Connor (2003) .
The more traditional forensic sciences are organized in national institutes for the forensic sciences. 73 These governmental laboratories are typically part of the national departments of justice. They maintain close relationships with academia, having prominent scientific boards with renowned scientists from various disciplines. University professors closely cooperate with the institutes, are called upon to assist in particular investigations, and teach in specialized masters programs on forensic science. 74 The institutes publish best-practice manuals, accredit independent experts and organize conferences, expert working groups, and other platforms to advance the discipline.
It appears that the practice of forensic IO could benefit from a similar type of organization, preferably, it appears, on a European level. The agencies and the courts could rely on such an independent institute or society for expert advice in complex competition cases. It could further be a reference source to reputable specialists. If such an entity were set up as an economics division of existing forensic organization, such as the European Academy of Forensic Science, there are obvious synergies across the sciences. The ideal team of forensic skills, including forensic IT and data analysts, could be put together around forensic IO specialists to help solve complicated competition cases.
The traditional forensic sciences seemingly owe much of their popularity to suspense novels, drama series, and television documentaries. Although it is likely that capital crime will always remain more appealing to a broader audience, antitrust acts can be just as shocking and suspenseful. In fact, several internal cartel cases have inspired best-selling courtroom/law suspense novels. 75 The footage of the Lysine cartel members meeting in hotel rooms, which the FBI managed to obtain with cameras hidden in table lamps, shows just how exciting white collar antitrust crimes are. Lysine, just like the latest cartel decision of the European Commission in Dutch Beers, contains enough thriller and script for several episodes of Forensic Detectives. 76 The same is true for the various Microsoft cases. Add to this the potential for international conflicts between the agencies and their respective governments and you have the stuff that movies are made of. To attract the attention of the public in that way would not only make for effective marketing of the specialty discipline, but could also raise awareness of the serious harm that competition law violations often cause.
